Your Rivals May Be Helping Regulators Decide Where to Look
Corporate political activity is usually framed as a way for firms to influence rules, taxes, contracts, or regulation in their own favor.
But firms can also use political relationships against competitors—especially during enforcement, when regulators are trying to determine who may be violating existing rules.
A 2026 Strategic Management Journal study examines this less visible strategy: firms providing regulators with information about rivals’ potential violations in an effort to encourage enforcement.
In “Persuasion in the political marketplace: How firms snitch on rivals to encourage regulatory enforcement,” Benjamin Barber IV, Gianluigi Giustiziero, and Simon Weschle develop a formal model and test its implications using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency data.
Their key argument is that firms are most likely to provide useful intelligence about competitors when the alleged violations are potentially harmful enough that the regulator already has a strong reason to care.
The Research
The paper first develops a model of costly persuasion between a regulator and competing firms. One firm may have private information about a rival’s noncompliance and can choose whether to communicate that information to the regulator.
Existing corporate political activity can reduce the cost of that communication by giving firms access to regulators and an established channel through which information can be transmitted.
The authors then test the model with panel data on EPA enforcement actions covering more than 8,000 facilities across more than 90 industries over 12 years.
They examine whether competitors’ lobbying activity toward the EPA is associated with the regulator’s likelihood of fining a focal facility, particularly when potential violations could create greater harm.
Why “Snitching” Can Be Persuasive
A regulator does not necessarily accept information from a competitor at face value. The source has an obvious strategic incentive to hurt a rival.
That is why alignment matters.
The model predicts that competitor-provided information becomes more persuasive when the rival’s potential violations are likely to cause substantial harm. In those situations, the firm’s competitive motive and the regulator’s public-interest objective point in the same direction.
The regulator wants to identify serious violations. The competitor wants a rival’s costly noncompliance addressed. Information can therefore be useful even when the source is not neutral.
Competitor Lobbying Was Associated With More Targeted Enforcement
The empirical results are consistent with that logic.
Facilities processing larger quantities of toxic chemicals were more likely to be fined when firms in their industry engaged in greater lobbying toward the EPA. The association was much weaker—and in some analyses moved in the opposite direction—for facilities processing less toxic material.
The pattern suggests that competitor political activity may help regulators concentrate enforcement on cases where violations are more consequential.
Notably, a firm’s own lobbying toward the EPA did not significantly reduce its own likelihood of being fined in the study.
That finding challenges a simple view of lobbying as a defensive shield. Political access may matter less as a way to escape enforcement than as a channel through which firms provide information that shapes where regulators look.
When Is Rival-Focused Political Activity More Likely?
The model and empirical analyses identify several boundary conditions.
First, firms need access to useful information about competitors. That is easier when rivals are geographically closer or when production processes are sufficiently comparable that firms can recognize unusual practices.
Second, firms need a reason to disclose what they know. Incentives are stronger when competition is more aggressive and when the target is a high-performing rival whose advantage may be worth challenging.
Third, the information needs to be relevant to the regulator. A complaint that appears self-serving but unrelated to meaningful harm is less likely to persuade.
What Leaders Should Do Differently
- Treat regulatory enforcement as a competitive arena: Competitive strategy does not stop when regulations are written. Firms should recognize that rivals may influence how enforcement resources are deployed.
- Monitor political activity around regulators, not only legislators: Many corporate political strategies focus on rule-setting. This study suggests that relationships with enforcement agencies can also shape competitive outcomes.
- Build credible compliance intelligence: If a firm chooses to communicate concerns about competitors, the information is more likely to matter when it is specific, credible, and aligned with the regulator’s institutional mission rather than framed as a generic competitive complaint.
- Assume rivals may be observing your compliance behavior: Firms in highly visible or environmentally sensitive operations should not treat regulatory risk as a private interaction between themselves and the agency. Competitors may also possess information and incentives to draw regulatory attention.
A Nuanced View of Corporate Political Activity
The paper does not argue that all lobbying improves enforcement or that all rival complaints are socially beneficial. Corporate political activity can still reflect strategic self-interest, and the broader literature documents many cases where firms seek preferential treatment.
The contribution here is narrower: during enforcement, strategically motivated firms can sometimes supply information that helps regulators identify higher-risk violations.
The Takeaway
The political marketplace is not only a contest over what the rules should be. It can also be a contest over how existing rules are enforced.
Barber, Giustiziero, and Weschle show that firms may use political access to provide regulators with intelligence about rivals, especially when potential violations are likely to create serious harm. EPA enforcement patterns are consistent with the idea that competitor lobbying helps direct attention toward more consequential cases.
For managers, the lesson is that regulatory strategy has a competitive dimension. Your firm’s relationship with regulators matters—but so do your rivals’ relationships with them.
Topics
Competitive Strategy
Governance & Leadership
Stakeholder Strategy
Big Six Questions in Strategic Management
About the Authors
Benjamin Barber IV is affiliated with IE University, Spain.
Gianluigi Giustiziero is affiliated with University of Manchester, UK.
Simon Weschle is affiliated with University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA.



